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1 INTRODUCTION
The recent economic and financial crises have set lawyers a difficult task: how
to make contracts crisis-proof? The M&A practice has long sought refuge with
theMaterial Adverse Change (MAC) clause; a boilerplate clause used to relieve
a buyer (or seller) from his contractual obligations in case the target company
suffers a MAC. Case law on the MAC clause is scarce,1 even in Delaware, where
most corporate cases in the United States are brought to court. The case law
currently available shows that judges are reluctant to accept that a material
adverse change has occurred and so the MAC clause has yet to prove its use
in court. However, the Nixon Peabody survey shows that a stunning 90% of
all M&A deals surveyed contain a MAC clause of some sort.2 So in practice,
the MAC clause is used extensively as a standard clause in M&A agreements.
This can be explained by the assumption that the MAC clause is not so much
used in court, as it is used as a bargaining tool for renegotiation.
The Dutch legal system codified the possibility for judges to ‘… modify
the effects of a contract or (…) [to] set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according
to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to
be maintained in unmodified form…’.3
This creates uncertainty for both parties. Does, for example, the economic
crisis constitute an unforeseen circumstance? Can a property developer walk
away from his contractual obligations by calling upon the unforeseen circum-
Vincent Engel is a master student company law at Leiden University.
1 Examples are: Delaware Ch. Court, IBP inc. v. Tyson Foods inc, (2001); Tennessee Ch. Court,
The Finish Line inc. v. Genesco inc (2007); and District Court of New York, Lasker v. UBS
Securities LLC (2008). A Dutch example is: Dutch Supreme Court 7 September 2007, LJN
BA2014 (Phoenix Acquisition Company Sarl v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.).
2 9th Annual MAC Survey,Nixon Peabody LLP, NewYork, 2010, (<www.nixonpeabody.com/
linked_media/publications/MAC_Survey_2010.pdf>).
3 Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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stance exemption, when a sudden decrease in housing prices confronts him
with a deal that is no longer profitable? An equitable solution will sometimes
be hard to find as either the property developer or the seller will have to bear
the risk of these developments. It is questionable whether the codification of
the unforeseen circumstances exemption alone will be able to provide the
solution to this uncertainty. Rather, one might look towards the MAC clause
for an answer.
The MAC clause can be – and is being – used outside the M&A field.4 It
is a practical way to allocate risk between parties during the period between
the signing and closing of an agreement and can possibly provide a solution
for the uncertainty caused by relying solely on the unforeseen circumstances
exemption. This paper will examine the (dis)advantages of using the MAC
clause, its use as a tool to allocate risk between parties, as a means to give
parties additional ways out of a deal and as a method for better risk assess-
ment. I will then move on to the question whether it might prove to be a
solution to the uncertainty problem. Before doing so, recent developments
in the use of the MAC clause will be analysed. To illustrate the uncertainty that
the unforeseen circumstances doctrine can bring, two recent Dutch cases will
be discussed. Finally, I will argue that the MAC clause and the unforeseen
circumstances doctrine should complement each other to provide a reasonable
and fair outcome in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
2 HISTORY OF THE MAC CLAUSE5
The MAC clause is a standard clause used in almost everymerger or acquisition
agreement.6 Although the specific wording and scope of the clause can differ
greatly from one contract to another, the goal is always the same: relieving
the buyer (or in some cases the seller) from a deal when a material adverse
change has occurred. The period of time between signing and closing of an
M&A deal may span threemonths or even a year. This is caused by e.g. waiting
for permission from regulatory institutions and/or due diligence reports. In
this period, many changes can occur to either the target company or the buyer.
The target company can lose important clients, key personnel, or suffer unfore-
seen losses. On the side of the buyer financing problems could occur.7 In the
event that such a change materializes, the buyer will want to walk away from
the deal, preferably without having to pay the usual walk-away fee. The MAC
4 For example in loan agreements.
5 As the MAC clause is most commonly used in M&A agreements, for reasons of simplicity,
this introduction will primarily use examples from the M&A practice.
6 9th Annual MAC Survey, Nixon Peabody LLP, 2010.
7 This became a more likely problem during the credit crunch. Think for example of the
bankruptcy of investment bank Lehmann Brothers in the fall of 2008.
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clause seeks to facilitate both parties in determining when a party is relieved
from his contractual obligations, or when he is not.
The MAC clause was first used as a boilerplate clause in general wording
meant to include most unforeseen circumstances. During the negotiation
process the MAC clause did not get much attention. In recent years, however,
it has moved from a catch-all standard to a highly negotiated and specifically
designed clause with carve-outs and exceptions.8 In other words, the MAC
clause, originally designed to circumvent problems with unforeseen circum-
stances, has changed from an unforeseen circumstances clause to a clause that
specifically mentions what does andwhat does not constitute an (unforeseen)
material adverse change.9 The paradox is obvious.
A governmental judicial organ has still to decide a case allowing a MAC.
InHexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. et al. v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL
(Sept. 29, 2008) the Delaware Chancery court states that:10
‘Many commentators have noted that Delaware courts have never found amaterial
adverse effect to have occurred in the context of a merger agreement. This is not
a coincidence. The ubiquitous material adverse effect clause should be seen as
providing a backstop protecting the acquirer from the occurrence of unknown
events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a
durationally-significant manner.’
This led the International Bar Association, at the Conference in October 2010,
to conclude that it is ‘Game over for MAC clauses’.11
The ‘new’ MAC clause and the uncertainty as to what actually can be
defined as a MAC, has perhaps taken away some of its core function: relieving
a party from its contractual obligations in case of a material adverse change.
To counter this problem, corporate lawyers now try to specify what, by its
nature, cannot be specified: an unforeseen circumstance.
By distinguishing between the function of a material adverse change clause
and the function of the unforeseen circumstance exemption, one might find
a solution for the current uncertainty.
8 R.J. Gilson&A. Schwartz, ‘UnderstandingMACs:Moral Hazard in Acquisitions’, The Journal
of Law, Economics, & Organization 2005, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 330-331.
9 This paper will not go into the many changes the MAC clause has undergone in recent
years, as it would exceed its scope. Comparing the yearly editions of the Nixon Peabody
Surveywill provide a rough idea of recent trends and developments. Also, see: A.C. Elken,
‘Rethinking the Material Adverse Change Clause in Merger and Acquisition Agreements:
Should The United States Consider the BritishModel?’, Southern California Law Review 2008-
2009, Vol. 82, pp. 291-339.
10 Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. et al. v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL (Sept. 29, 2008)
at II.B.
11 International Bar Association 2010 Conference, ‘Game over for MAC clauses’, IBA Daily
News, 6 October 2010, p. 4.
106 8 – The Material Adverse Change clause from a Dutch perspective
3 UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE SALE OF PROPERTY
Property developers face a difficulty when buying property: will current
housing prices increase or decrease? The 2007 crisis caused housing prices
to drop dramatically. In some cases this meant that prospected benefits turned
into losses. Although every property developer knows, or at least should know,
that housing prices can drop, there are examples in Dutch case law where the
buyer argued that he should be relieved from his contractual obligations as
the economic crisis was to be considered an unforeseen circumstance. They
called on Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code and asked the court
to dissolve the contract or at least be exempted from liability for damages.
Two recent cases will be analysed here. The first case is between the muni-
cipality of Zutphen and the State of the Netherlands.12 Combined with the
second example, it will show that it is not always clear to parties when unfore-
seen circumstances can exempt the buyer from having to fulfil his contractual
obligations. Also, I will argue that the use of the MAC clause could have taken
away some of this uncertainty and might contribute to a more efficient deal.
3.1 Municipality of Zutphen v. State of the Netherlands
In July 2006 the State of the Netherlands signed an agreement with (among
others) the municipality of Zutphen, the local court, and the local office of
the public prosecutor. In summary, the agreement held that the State would
buy land and develop a new building to be occupied by the local office of
the public prosecutor. In a letter datedMay 31, 2010 themunicipality was told
that the new office would not be built, and that the office of the public prose-
cutor would be relocated outside the municipality.
The dispute focussed on the fact that the State refused to fulfil its con-
tractual obligations. It stated that as unforeseen circumstances occurred, it
could not reasonably be required to uphold the agreement. The office of the
public prosecutor has to cut cost and as such needs to reorganize. The office
in Zutphen will be merged with and relocated to a different municipality,
which results in the new building becoming redundant. The municipality, on
the other hand, points out that the State could have foreseen this change in
policy. As the planning for the reorganization started before the signing of
the agreement, the possibility of a change should be considered as already
having been taken into account.
The court decided that the State of the Netherlands could not and did not
have to take into account the possible changes that might occur after signing
the agreement. As nothing has been negotiated on the subject, the change in
policy and the changes that occurred due to the reorganization constitute
12 District Court of Den Haag 21 February 2011, LJN BP5123.
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unforeseen circumstances. The court then goes on to ask the questionwhether
these unforeseen circumstances should lead to the conclusion that the agree-
ment cannot reasonably remain unchanged. It considers that although the
municipality has a great interest in fulfilment of the contract, the State has
an even greater interest in not building the new office. The court concludes
that the State does not have to fulfil its contractual obligations, especially since
it offered to compensate the municipality for possible damages.
3.2 Plaintiffs v. Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV13
On March 14, 2009 the plaintiffs sold a property to Nieuwwaerde Projecten
BV, a property developer. The property was to be delivered and paid for on
July 1, 2009. A few days before the contract was to be concluded, the property
developer notified the plaintiffs of the fact that he would not be able to fulfil
his obligation to pay the purchase price. As renegotiations went nowhere, the
case came before the District Court of Zutphen. The plaintiffs requested that
the property developer should pay the fine as agreed upon in the sale agree-
ment and, in addition, should be held liable for damages. The damages claim
is based on the fact that due to the credit crunch, housing prices dropped and
so the property lost its original value. It is the plaintiffs’ view that the property
developer should bear this risk and as such he should be held accountable
for damages. The property developer should also bear the risk and responsibil-
ity for the fact that he could not get any financing for the deal, as this was
not a condition for closing the deal.
The property developer pleaded that he had started a procedure consider-
ing the realization of twelve apartments. Due to the economic crisis themarket
for these apartments had collapsed. As a consequence the plans that had been
made for the property were no longer feasible. The long period of time
between signing and closing made it seem unnecessary, if not impossible, to
agree on a financing arrangement clause as a condition for closing the deal.
As the property developer was also held liable in person, he argued that at
the time when he agreed to his personal liability the risks were smaller. The
unforeseen circumstances have altered the implications of this agreement.
Therefore he cannot be held liable in person, nor should the current agreement
remain unchanged.
The court considers that the economy in general and the property market
in particular are subject to changes.14 Being a property developer, the defend-
ant should have known this fact. As such, the economic situation in which
13 District Court of Zutphen 30 September 2009, LJN BK3761.
14 ibid. § 4.4.
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housing prices drop cannot constitute a truly exceptional, nor unforeseeable,
circumstance.15 As a result, Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV – and the property
developer personally – are ordered to pay the fine and damages to the plain-
tiffs.
When comparing these cases there is one important observation to be made.
The different outcomes in the cases do not look surprising and there appear
to be sufficient differences to justify the different outcomes. However, the
economic crisis plays an important role in both cases and the two courts both
needed to answer the question whether the change of circumstances was
unforeseeable. While the District Court of Zutphen argued that it is a well-
known fact that changes in the economy occur, the District Court of The Hague
considered the change in policy as a result of cutting costs to be unforeseeable.
Nevertheless, it is unclear why one situation is foreseeable and the other is
not. If the property developer cannot be exempted from liability for damages
because the dramatic drop in housing prices was foreseeable, should the State
then not know that a change in the economy could result in the need for
cutting cost? And was the possibility of a reorganization of the office of the
public prosecutor not foreseeable? If we were to assume that the economic
crisis does not constitute an unforeseeable circumstance in Plaintiffs v. Nieuw-
waerde Projecten BV, then the fact that the State offered compensation for
damages can, inmy opinion, not justify the fact that the contract was dissolved
by calling upon Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch civil code.
The main focus point in these cases concerning unforeseeable circumstances
seems to be the (un)foreseeability of the change of circumstances. The apparent-
ly inconsistent rulings from the District Court of The Hague and the District
Court of Zutphen illustrate that there ismuch uncertainty regarding the scope
of the unforeseen circumstances exemption.
4 COULD THE MAC CLAUSE PROVIDE A SOLUTION?
Whether or not the State could have foreseen the change of circumstances,
difficulties and litigation could have been prevented bymaking express provi-
sions in the agreement. Also, Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV could have sought
protection by negotiating these same express provisions. Borrowing from the
M&A practice, the MAC clause is probably the most obvious example of such
a provision.
The MAC clause has two functions that could benefit parties in situations
such as thosementioned above. First, it gives parties the possibility to provide
for other ways out of a contract than those offered by the general provisions
15 To a certain degree the same argument has beenmade in the United Kingdom byMr Justice
Coulson in Gold Group Properties Ltd v. BDW Trading Ltd, 2010, EWHC 323 (TCC).
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of contract law.16 Secondly, it is being used as a tool to allocate risk between
parties.17
The first function is perhaps the most obvious one. As contract law pro-
vides only a general framework to facilitate contracting between parties, it
cannot and should not regulate every possible contingency. This does mean,
that in some cases the frustration, forcemajeure, or unforeseen circumstances18
provisions provided by contract law –whether codified or not – do not provide
contracting parties with the possibility to expressly agree on a change of
circumstances they want to account for in their agreement. Thus, when parties
rely solely on contract law to solve future differences when a change of circum-
stances occurs, they might be surprised by the outcome of their conflict.
This is where the MAC clause’s first function becomes more apparent. By
making use of the MAC clause, parties have the opportunity to expressly agree
on certain circumstances that should be considered as unforeseen circum-
stances, or a material adverse change. By doing so, they take away at least
some of the uncertainty that arises from a conflict in which parties rely solely
on contract law.
The project developer could, for example, negotiate a MAC clause that
protects him from a deterioration of the property market by agreeing on a
certain level of profitability of the project. If this level of profitability cannot
be reached, he would then have the right to walk away from the deal. Parties
could also agree that any change in the economy does not constitute amaterial
adverse change. Carve-outs or exceptions to this clause could further specify
what does and what does not constitute an unforeseen circumstance or material
adverse change. By making explicit what parties understand by unforeseen
circumstances or a material adverse change, the MAC clause could prevent
litigation over the (un)foreseeability of a change of circumstances.
This brings us to the second function of the MAC clause, which is, to a
certain extent, a consequence of the first function. As parties actively negotiate
the MAC clause they immediately assign the risks for the period between
signing and closing. It does not matter who bears the risk in the end, for as
long as parties know which risks they are taking, they can assess these risks
more easily and thus take better-informed decisions. Also, if the property
developer had fully assumed the possible risks of what could happen in the
16 L. Alpren-Waterman, ‘Frustration and Material Adverse Change – The Secret to Avoiding
Contracts in Troubled Times?’, Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP 2010, p. 3. (<http://www.blg.co.
uk//pdf/Gold%20Group.pdf>)
17 A.J. Macias., Risk Allocation and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-
Adverse-Change (MACs) Clauses (AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper), 17 April 2009,
p. 31 (<ssrn.com/abstract=1108792>).
18 Although subtle differences between these terms exist, it would exceed the scope of this
paper to go into these differences. These are just some examples of more or less the same
principle trying to adjust for a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable and makes
a contractual obligation impossible or much more onerous to perform.
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two years between signing and closing, he might have negotiated a different
price. When risk is assigned to the buyer, he will be less likely to offer the
full price for the property. If risk is assigned to the seller, hewill want a higher
price as the property becomesmore valuable when risk is almost non-existent.
The allocation of risk to either party will be reflected in the price.19
In short, the MAC clause offers explicitly stated possibilities for a way out
of a contract other than those offered by contract law. It also allocates risk
between parties and thus allows them to take these risks into account when
negotiating a price.
The question that needs answering now is how the MAC clause can be
incorporated into the Dutch legal system that codified the possibility for judges
to
‘… modify the effects of a contract or (…) [to] set it aside, in whole or in part, on
the basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to
be maintained in unmodified form…’.
Some might fear an overlap with Art. 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code
and argue that the MAC clause puts in a contractual form what corporate law
already provided for. Despite a possible overlap, theMAC clause distinguishes
itself by being more specific and allowing parties to evaluate their risk in
advance. The codified unforeseen circumstances exemption and the MAC clause
complement each other. Since the MAC clause moved from a general catch-all
solution to a more specific and more negotiated clause it has gained in clarity
what it has lost in protection. One cannot account for the unforeseeable and
by specifying certain risks one is bound to exclude others. Instead of opting
for the unforeseen circumstances doctrine or the MAC clause exclusively, we
should combine the strengths of both. Contracting parties should find a balance
between unforeseen circumstances provisions and the MAC clause.20 By speci-
fying and therewith allocating certain risks in a MAC clause, parties have less
uncertainty and should be able to assess their risks more accurately. For those
circumstances that cannot be accounted for – because they are simply unfore-
seeable – they can rely on the unforeseen circumstances provision and find
a fair and reasonable solution for the new situation.
19 See: Macias 2009, p. 17, who grounds this thesis for mergers and acquisitions on empirical
research.
20 While keeping in mind that those circumstances described in the MAC clause can, by
definition, not be regarded as unforeseen.
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5 CONCLUSION
The MAC clause has undergone amake-over in recent years. It has moved away
from a boilerplate solution to a heavily negotiated, specific and complex clause.
These changes and the lack of affirmative case law has led scholars and law-
yers to believe that perhaps the MAC clause can no longer achieve its goals
and has become obsolete. The Nixon Peabody survey shows that the MAC
clause is still an important contractual tool to allocate risk and provide a way
to walk away from a deal.
The two cases mentioned above illustrate the paradoxical, if not contra-
dictory, way the unforeseen circumstances doctrine, as codified in the Dutch
Civil Code, can work. It is my belief that in both cases the use of a MAC clause
could have prevented litigation, or at the least have accommodated a better
assessment and allocation of risk. Bearing a risk one knows of is to be preferred
to possibly bearing a risk one does not know of.
The combination of the unforeseen circumstances exemption and the MAC
clause, not competing with, but complementing each other, could provide for
more certainty in the period between signing and closing.

